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Abstract
Cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games can usually be sustained only if
the game has an inﬁnite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoret-
ically crucial distinction of ﬁnite vs. inﬁnite-horizon games is reﬂected in
the outcomes of a prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We compare three dif-
ferent experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known ﬁnite
end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule
(with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation
can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probabil-
ity). We ﬁnd that the termination rules do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect average
cooperation rates. Speciﬁcally, employing a random termination rule does
not cause signiﬁcantly more cooperation compared to a known ﬁnite hori-
zon, and the continuation probability does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect average
cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may inﬂuence
cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected)
length of the game signiﬁcantly increases cooperation rates. The results
suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like
repetitions of the supergame) before signiﬁcant backward induction argu-
ments in ﬁnitely repeated game have force.
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Experimental economics
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11 Introduction
The game-theoretic predictions for repeated games crucially depend on whether
a game is ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely repeated. In a ﬁnitely repeated dilemma game,
cooperation usually cannot occur (Luce and Raiﬀa 1957), but it can emerge
if the game has inﬁnitely many periods. There are several exceptions to this
rule. Cooperation can be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a
ﬁnitely repeated game if, for example, the stage game has multiple Nash equi-
libria (Benoit and Krishna 1985; 1987), if there is uncertainty about players’
preferences (Kreps et al. 1982), or if the number of periods to be played is not
common knowledge (Samuelson 1987; Neymann 1999). Also, when players have
other-regarding preferences (for example, if they are inequality averse), coopera-
tion can emerge in ﬁnitely repeated games (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000). Nevertheless, a complete-information prisoner’s dilemma game
with a unique equilibrium in the stage game and where players have standard
preferences requires inﬁnitely many repetitions for cooperation to be possible.
Because the issue of ﬁnitely vs. inﬁnitely many repetitions is crucial in the-
ory, it needs to be carefully addressed in the design of laboratory experiments.
However, whereas experimentalists have certainly paid close attention to the
design of experimental termination rules, no consensus seems to exist regarding
the most suitable experimental design as far as this point is concerned. As we
will see, experimentalists use diﬀerent rules and they seem to disagree about
the pros and cons of them. We will also see that there are contradicting results
about how the termination rules aﬀect cooperation.
Which termination rules are used in experiments? The ﬁrst termination rule,
the ﬁnite horizon, is simply to repeat the stage game of the experiment a ﬁnite
number of times and to inform participants about the number of repetitions
in the instructions. This rule was used, for example, in the early experiments
of Flood (1952) and Rapoport and Chammah (1965). The second rule (which
we label unknown horizon) is to refrain from informing participants about the
actual length of the experiment (e.g., Fouraker and Siegel 1963). The experi-
menter may tell participants that there will be a “large” number of repetitions,
or that there will be a certain minimum number of periods they will play, but
the actual number of periods is unknown. The third termination rule is to im-
pose a random-stopping rule to terminate the experiment (Roth and Murnighan
1978; Axelrod 1980). The termination mechanism (for example, the throw of a
die or a random computer draw) and the termination probability are explained
in detail in the instructions.
Since experimentalists use these diﬀerent methods for ending cooperation
experiments, it seems useful to review which properties of the experimental
termination rules they regard as (non-)desirable:
2– Presumably inﬂuenced by Luce and Raiﬀa’s (1957) theoretical result, ex-
perimentalists often saw a need to avoid the unraveling of cooperation that
may occur due to the ﬁniteness of the horizon. If the proposition that co-
operation cannot occur in ﬁnitely repeated games has descriptive power in
experiments, then the ﬁnite horizon is not suitable for cooperation experi-
ments whereas the random stopping rule and the unknown horizon would
be. Empirically, however, it is well known that stable cooperation does
occur also in ﬁnitely repeated games.
– A related concern is to avoid end-game eﬀects. Morehous (1966) observed
that defection rates increase towards the end of the game when the hori-
zon of the game is known to be ﬁnite. Thus, even though cooperation
does usually not completely unravel with a ﬁnite horizon, some studies
try to avoid this end-game eﬀect by using the random stopping rule or the
unknown horizon. For example, Axelrod’s ﬁrst tournament had a known
and ﬁxed duration of 200 periods whereas his second tournament used a
probabilistic termination rule so that “end-game eﬀects were successfully
avoided” (Axelrod 1984, p. 42). Murnighan and Roth (1983, p. 284) argue
that “consideration of end-game play is less critical” with the random ter-
mination rule. Holt (1985, p. 320) makes the same point. Alternatively,
rather than avoiding end-game eﬀects with the termination rule, some ex-
perimenters simply discard the ﬁnals period(s) of the game from the data
so that no bias due to end-game eﬀects can aﬀect the data analysis.1
– Experimentalists are also concerned about transparency and control. Holt
(1985) prefers to fully inform subjects about the things to come in an ex-
periment. The lack of transparency is an argument against the unknown
horizon. Also, with that termination rule, “subjects must form subjec-
tive probabilities greater than zero that a given period might be the last”
(Roth and Murnighan 1978, p. 191). This rule thus lacks experimental
control. The random termination rule and the ﬁnite horizon are transpar-
ent and enable control.
– Another goal mentioned in the literature is to make the theory of inﬁnitely
repeated games applicable to the experiment. With ﬁnitely many peri-
ods, the theory is bland; by contrast, the random termination rule “per-
mits the nature of the equilibrium outcomes to be controlled” (Roth and
1For recent references, see Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2006), Orzen (2008) or Suetens and Potters
(2007).
3Murnighan 1978, p. 191). However, Selten, Mikzewitz and Uhlich (1997)
argue that inﬁnitely repeated games cannot be played in the laboratory.
Participants will be aware that experiments can only be of ﬁnite duration
as the experimenter simply cannot continue “forever”. Selten, Mikzewitz
and Uhlich (1997, p. 517) point out that “the stopping probability cannot
remain ﬁxed but must become one eventually”. From this perspective,
eﬀorts to match the theoretical requirements of inﬁnitely repeated games
would miss the point.
In this paper, our aim is to investigate how the termination rules aﬀect
cooperation empirically, rather than adding to the debate of potential (dis-
)advantages of termination rules. We conduct a series of laboratory experiments
comparing diﬀerent termination rules for repeated-game experiments. How the
experimental designs regarding the termination of the game aﬀect cooperation
rates is of signiﬁcance for both theorists and experimentalists. For game theo-
rists, it seems to be of some importance to learn to what extent the distinction of
ﬁnite vs. inﬁnite horizon is reﬂected quantitatively in the outcomes of coopera-
tion experiments; observational experience can then be useful for a reﬂection on
assumptions. For experimentalists, it is essential to learn about the eﬀects of the
experimental designs because they may aﬀect cooperation rates and therefore
bias the experimental results if diﬀerent studies adopt diﬀerent designs.
Here is a summary of what we know about how these experimental designs
aﬀect cooperation rates. We have already mentioned that stable cooperation
emerges even with ﬁnitely many repetitions but that end-game eﬀects occur.
Selten and Stoecker (1983) further noted that subjects learn to anticipate the
endgame eﬀect in that this eﬀect is shifted to earlier rounds when a supergame
with a ﬁnite horizon is repeated several times (see also Andreoni and Miller
1993). In that case, there is more unraveling and backward induction arguments
have more force. Roth and Murnighan (1978) found that a random stopping
rule with higher continuation probability does lead to more cooperation in the
prisoner’s dilemma. However, in the modiﬁed setup analyzed in Murnighan
and Roth (1983), this could not be conﬁrmed.2 Engle-Warnick and Slonim
(2004) ran trust game sessions with a known horizon of ﬁve periods and sessions
with a random stopping rule with a continuation probability of 0.8. Their
data show that the level of trust does not vary in the two treatments with
inexperienced players even though the supergame was played twenty times. Dal
Bo (2005) found that the continuation probability of the random-stopping rule
matters when various prisoner’s dilemma supergames are repeated ten times.
2The experimental design in Roth and Murnighan (1978) and Murnighan and Roth (1983)
deviates from standard prisoner’s dilemma experiments (like ours). See the discussion in Roth
(1995).
4The (expected) number of periods to be played was one, two and four in Dal
Bo’s experiments. We compare our ﬁndings to those of Dal Bo (2005) in the
Discussion below.3
Our research extends these ﬁndings by analyzing all three termination rules
for repeated games within a uniﬁed framework. Our main treatments focus on a
setting that is frequently applied in social dilemma experiments—a design with
“many” periods (at least 22) and where the supergame is not repeated. For
such a setting, we compare the impact of the termination rules on cooperation
in a prisoner’s dilemma. We employ the ﬁnite and known horizon, the unknown
horizon, and the random-stopping rule is analyzed with a high and with a low
continuation probability (where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium only with the high probability). We check for the robustness of
these results with additional treatments which have an (expected) length of
only ﬁve and ten periods.
Our ﬁndings are that the termination rules do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect average
cooperation rates, but they may inﬂuence cooperation over time and end-game
behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game signiﬁcantly increases
cooperation rates.
2 Theory and Experimental Design
The stage game underlying our cooperation experiments is the prisoner’sdilemma
in Table 1. This is a standard two-player prisoner’s dilemma with Si = {defect,
cooperate}, i=1,2, as strategy sets (in the experiment, a neutral labeling for
the strategies was used). The static Nash equilibrium of the game in Table 1 is
{defect, defect}.
3Recently, this literature has seen a substantial growth. Related to our research question,
albeit less relevant, are the following ﬁndings. Gonzales et al. (2005) have suggested a new
termination method. In public-goods experiments, they contrast a known ﬁnite horizon with
various treatments where the termination period is only given by an interval. They ﬁnd that
asymmetric information about this interval reduces end-game eﬀects but replacing a deﬁnite
endpoint by a commonly or privately known symmetric interval does not have a signiﬁcant
impact on overall cooperation. Bruttel, G¨ uth and Kamecke (2011) analyze prisoner’s dilemma
settings where information about the horizon of the game is not common knowledge and where
cooperation can be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium as a result. Finally, Bruttel et al.
(2011) investigate ﬁnitely repeated games with and without multiple equilibria of the stage
game. They ﬁnd that the nature of the additional equilibrium matters (strict versus non-
strict).
5defect cooperate
defect 350, 350 1000, 50
cooperate 50,1000 800, 800
Table 1: The stage game
Our four treatments reﬂect the above discussion of termination rules. In
treatment Known, the end of the experiment was given to the participants
simply by saying that the experiment would last for 22 periods. In treatment
Unknown, the length of the experiment (28 periods) was not mentioned to the
participants and the instructions merely said that the experiment would last at
least 22 periods. In RandomLow, the instructions said that the experiment
would last at least 22 periods, and then the experiment would continue with a
probability of 1/6.4 In treatment RandomHigh, there were at least 22 periods
and then the experiment would continue with a probability of 5/6.5 A copy
of the instructions is contained in an appendix. In all four treatments, the
matching of participants was ﬁxed over the entire experiment. We have data
from 15 pairs for each treatment.
Additionally, we ran three further treatments designed to test the impact of
the length of the horizon of the game. We will report on the design of these
treatments and the results in section 4 below.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium predictions for the treatments are
as follows. The static Nash equilibrium, {defect, defect}, is also the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the ﬁnitely repeated game in treatment
Known. In Unknown, we cannot control for subjects’ prior on the termina-
tion of the experiment. The static Nash equilibrium may apply but possibly
repeated-game arguments have bite as well. If we ignore Selten, Mikzewitz and
Uhlich’s (1997) argument, we can make predictions based on inﬁnitely repeated
games for the treatments with a random end. From Stahl (1991), {cooperate,
cooperate} is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the inﬁnitely re-
4Feinberg and Husted (1993) induce discounting in an alternative way. They have a ran-
dom stopping rule but additionally they shrink gradually the payoﬀs in a reduced two-action
Cournot game. Using experienced subjects, they ﬁnd a quantitatively minor increase of co-
operation with higher discount factors.
5We control for the minimum number of periods rather than the expected number of periods
across treatments because an analysis of the impact of termination rules requires that subjects
play the same number of periods before the termination rule is triggered. In Unknown, we
cannot control for the expected number of periods anyway.
6peated game if and only if the discount factor is larger than 4/13 ≈ 0.31.
Cooperation among rational and risk neutral players may thus only emerge in
RandomHigh. In RandomLow, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
is {defect, defect}.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental laboratory at Royal
Holloway College (University of London) and University College London using z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 182 students participated. Average payments
were £7.20 or roughly $14. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes including time for
reading the instructions.
3 Experimental Results
We start by looking at cooperation rates in the four main treatments. Table 2
reports the number of cooperate choices per pair. We refer to the ﬁrst 22 peri-
ods, so the maximum is 44 cooperate choices.6 Average cooperation rates are
44.2% in Known, 55.0% in Unknown, 55.2% in RandomLow and 59.1% in
RandomHigh.
Treatment cooperate choices per pair rate
Known 44 43 42 42 36 22 13 11 10 9 7 6 3 3 1 44.2%
Unknown 44 43 43 36 35 34 24 21 21 16 13 11 11 9 2 55.0%
RandomLow 43 43 43 43 42 37 30 19 16 14 13 12 8 1 0 55.2%
RandomHigh 44 44 44 43 41 33 32 31 21 17 13 10 7 6 2 59.1%
Table 2: Results by (ordered) pairs
In all treatments, there is a large variation in cooperation rates across the
ﬁfteen pairs. Some pairs cooperate in all (or nearly all) periods, others virtually
never.
In order to take the possible dependence of observations between paired
playersinto account, we count each participating pair as one observation. Taking
all four treatments into consideration, we ﬁnd that these cooperation rates do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (Kruskal-Wallis test, H=1.929, d.f.=3, p=0.587). The
four distributions of cooperate choices do not diﬀer according to a median test
6In four out of the six sessions with a random end, play stopped after period 22. The
remaining two sessions had a length of 23 and 26 periods and occurred in RandomHigh.
7either (χ2=1.268, d.f.=3, p=0.737). From this and further robustness checks7,
we conclude that























































Figure 1: Cooperation over time
Figure 1 shows the time path of cooperate choices in the experiments. The
time paths of the four treatments often overlap, so we show the data in two sep-
7We can compare the four treatments pairwise even though the Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test
is not signiﬁcant, but Mann-Whitney U tests do not indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
distributions. The p values, not corrected for multiple comparisons, range between 0.65 in
RandomLow vs RandomHigh and 0.24 in Known vs RandomHigh. Neither do Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the distributions (p values, not corrected
for multiple comparisons, range between 0.55 in RandomLow vs RandomHigh and 0.35 in
Known vs RandomHigh).
8arate ﬁgures. All treatments start at a level of around ﬁfteen cooperate choices
(or 50%). Known and Unknown stay at this level until about period 12. Af-
ter that, the number of cooperate choices declines in Known but it increases
in Unknown. Treatments RandomHigh and RandomLow seem very similar
although, until period 18, cooperate choices in RandomHigh appear to be in-
creasing whereas they stay at or above the initial level of 15 in RandomLow.
After that, cooperation drops in both Random treatments. We ﬁnd a negative
and signiﬁcant time trend in Known (p = 0.002) and RandomLow (p = 0.013)
but no other signiﬁcant time trend.8
Result 2 There is a negative and signiﬁcant time trend in treatments Known
and RandomLow.
In all treatments but Unknown, cooperation declines as play approaches
period 22. We follow a standard procedure to test for possible end-game eﬀects.
We compare cooperation rates in periods 10 to 19 to the average rate in peri-
ods 20 to 22 with a related-sample test and separately for all treatments. We
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly lower cooperation rates in the last three periods in treatment
Known (matched-pairs Wilcoxon, Z = −3.06, p = 0.002), and RandomLow
(Z = −2.14, p = 0.021), and RandomHigh (Z = −2.38, p = 0.017). In Un-
known, there is more cooperation in the last two periods. While this increase
in not signiﬁcant (Z = −1.27, p = 0.203), cooperation rates are higher beyond
period 22 such that the cooperation rate over all periods is 58% Unknown. By
contrast, in the one RandomHigh session with 26 periods, cooperation rates
are 5 percentage points lower beyond period 22. We obtain virtually identical
results when we compare periods 11 to 20 to the average rate in periods 21 to
22.
Result 3 A signiﬁcant end-game eﬀect occurs in all treatments except Un-
known.
4 Treatments with a Shorter Horizon
There is one aspect of our design that, although common to cooperation exper-
iments, could account for the results we found. With at least 22 periods, the
length of our games may be said to be “long”. In shorter games, the impact of
8Time trends are analyzed by calculating Spearman correlation coeﬃcients of cooperate
choices over time separately for each pair. A sign test using the ﬁfteen (statistically indepen-
dent) correlation coeﬃcients for each treatment indicates whether the time trend is signiﬁcant.
9the termination rule may be more signiﬁcant. Thus, it seems useful to test the
robustness of our results in additional treatments that vary the length of the
prisoner’s dilemma games. A richer set of treatments with diﬀerent (expected)
number of periods also allows to test whether the length of the horizon of the
game per se has an impact on cooperation.
Speciﬁcally, we conducted two further treatments with a known ﬁnite horizon
of ﬁve (Known5) and ten periods (Known10), respectively, and we also ran a
treatment called Random5+5 in which there were at least ﬁve periods, after
which the experiment would continue with a probability of 5/6. The expected
number of periods was ten in Random5+5 which corresponds to the number
of periods in Known10; and the minimum number of periods in Random5+5
corresponds to Known5. The game theoretic predictions for these treatments
are the same as those derived above for Known and RandomHigh, respec-
tively. In Known5, we had nine pairs participating and in both Known10 and
Random5+5 eleven pairs participated.9
Treatment cooperate percentage per pair rate
Known5 100 50 40 40 20 20 20 20 0 34.4%
Known10 95 90 85 60 25 25 20 20 15 15 5 41.4%
Random5+5 100 100 80 80 50 30 20 20 10 0 0 44.5%
Table 3: Results by (ordered) pairs, cooperation rates in percent.
Table 3 shows the results. As the number of periods diﬀers here, we report
percentages rather than absolute numbers (average over 5 periods in Known5,
10 periods in Known10 and the ﬁrst 5 periods in Random5+5). The coopera-
tion rates in Known10 and Random5+5 (which have the same expected num-
ber of periods) are very similar in their averages, while Known5 exhibits a lower
average. Testing for diﬀerences in cooperation with all treatments jointly does
not suggest signiﬁcant results (Kruskal-Wallis test, H=0.137, d.f.=2, p=0.853),
nor do any pair-wise comparisons.
Cooperation rates in Known5 and Known10 drop to a level of 22% and
18%, respectively, in the last period. This conﬁrms the end-game eﬀect found
9Each of these treatments was played twice. The second round of repeated games was
not announced and was conducted as a “surprise restart”. Subjects were rematched after
the ﬁrst supergame. In the second run of the experiment, cooperation rates go up by a
moderate but insigniﬁcant amount in all treatments (even if we ignore the possible dependence
of observations across the two supergames). Importantly, the diﬀerences between treatments
do not get bigger. We thus refrain from reporting further details of the second round.
10above. The negative time trend observed in Result 3 can be conﬁrmed only for
Known10 (p = 0.012) but not for Known5 (p = 0.754). In Random5+5,
cooperation rates are never below 36%, which does not conﬁrm the end-game
eﬀect found above for RandomLow and RandomHigh. There is no negative
time trend in Random5+5 (p = 0.508), although cooperation rates decrease to
40% after period 5 (there were 26 periods in total). As an aside, we note that,
if we discard the data from the last period(s), cooperations rates would be even
more similar between treatments.
Result 4 The termination rule does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect average cooperation
rates in treatments Known5, Known10, Random5+5.
Finally, we analyze whether the (expected) number of periods has an impact
on cooperation. To do this, we include all treatments (except for Unknown,
where we cannot control for subjects’ beliefs about the length of the game10)
and we use the expected number of periods (as opposed to the actual realization)
in each treatment. It turns out the length of the game matters. In support of
the hypothesis that a longer horizon leads to more cooperation, we can reject
that the data come from the same distribution using a Jonckheere-Terpstra test
(J-T statistic = 1.896, p = 0.029).11
Result 5 The length of the horizon of the game signiﬁcantly increases coop-
eration rates.
Treatment Known5 Known10 Random5+5 Known RandomLow RandomHigh
Exp. length 5 10 10 22 22.2 27
Coop. rate 34.4% 41.4% 44.5% 44.2% 55.2% 59.0%
Table 4: Expected length of the game and cooperation
10If we include the data from Unknown with the actual game length (which was not known
to subjects), the below result still hold.
11The Jonckheere-Terpstra test is a non-parametric test for more than two independent
samples, like the Kruskal-Wallis test. Unlike Kruskal-Wallis, Jonckheere-Terpstra tests for or-
dered diﬀerences between treatments and thus requires an ordinal ranking of the test variable.
See, e.g., Hollander and Wolfe (1999).
115 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze three termination rules for repeated-game prisoner’s
dilemmas. We ﬁnd that the termination rule does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
average cooperation rates. Employing a random termination rule does not cause
signiﬁcantly more cooperation compared to a known ﬁnite horizon. Comparing
the random termination rule with a low and a high continuation probability,
we ﬁnd that the continuation probability does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect average
cooperation rates either, as did Murnighan and Roth (1983).
In treatments with a known ﬁnite horizon, there is an end-game eﬀect with
cooperation rates dropping as the experiment approaches the minimum possi-
ble number of periods for the experimental duration. An end-game eﬀect also
occurred with the random termination rule in our treatments with at least 22
periods but not with the shorter horizon. Cooperation over time is also aﬀected
by the termination rule. A known ﬁnite horizon and a random stopping rule
with a low continuation probability exhibit a negative time trend. We also ﬁnd
that the length of the game does aﬀect cooperation rates signiﬁcantly. This is
consistent with Dal Bo (2005) where this result occurred for both ﬁnitely re-
peated games and in games with a random stopping rule (although, in his setup,
this can be rationalized with standard theory). Morehous (1966) and Bruttel et
al. (2009) also ﬁnd that longer horizons promote cooperation.
Dal Bo (2005) found that the continuation probability of the random-stopping
rule matters. In addition to diﬀerences in the base game, there are two diﬀer-
ences to our setting: Dal Bo’s (2005) games were shorter (the expected length
of the games were one, two and four, respectively) and the supergames were
repeated ten times. It is diﬃcult to assess to what extent the two diﬀerences
account for diﬀerences in the results. However, it appears that treatment diﬀer-
ences in Dal Bo’s (2005) early supergames were not as pronounced as they were
in the later during the experiment, and most of the learning seems to occur in
the ﬁrst two or three supergames. Thus it seems that subjects do need at least
some learning opportunities before signiﬁcant backward induction arguments in
ﬁnitely repeated game have force. A shorter horizon may support the learning
process. In such settings, the “shadow of the future” matters—whereas it does
not in our longer experiments that were not repeated many times.
The conclusion that subjects learn about the ﬁniteness of the game and that
thus cooperation rates drop if the supergame repeated is consistent with the
possibility that, when subjects read in the instructions that the horizon is ﬁ-
nite, this may not imply that the ﬁnite horizon is really common knowledge. If
so, even rational and selﬁsh players may cooperate with ﬁnitely many periods
(Samuelson 1987; Neymann 1999; Bruttel, G¨ uth and Kamecke, 2011), as men-
tioned above. With repetitions of the supergame, eventually the ﬁnite duration
will become common knowledge and unraveling of cooperation may occur. But
12this learning process may be slow if there are, in addition, subjects with other-
regarding preferences that try to cooperate even when the game is commonly
known to be ﬁnite.
13Appendix
Here are the instructions for the RandomHigh treatment. The instructions for
the other treatments are similar and are available from the authors.
Experimental Instructions
Welcome to the experiment! Take the time to read carefully the instructions. A
good understanding of the instructions and well thought out decisions during the
experiment can earn you a considerable amount of money. All earnings from
the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you
do have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the co-ordinators will
come to you and answer it privately. Please do not talk to anyone during the
experiment.
You are participating in an experiment in which you interact with one other
participant. The person with whom you interact is always the same.
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is assigned one of two roles,
either A or B. Everybody keeps his or her role throughout the entire experiment.
Before the experiment starts, each participant with role A is randomly matched
with a participant with role B. This matching is then maintained throughout
the entire experiment.
The experiment is repeated for at least 22 rounds. After the 22nd round (and
each subsequent round), a dice roll decides whether the experiment continues or
not. The experiment terminates if a 6 is thrown and continues otherwise. The
computer throws the dice.
Each round is the same.
———
During each round, the following happens: A has to choose between Left
and Right and B has to choose between Up and Down. Decisions are made
without the knowledge of the other participants decision (i.e. they are made
simultaneously). The payoﬀs are then given in the following table:
So, for example, if A chooses Left and B chooses Down, A receives a payoﬀ of




Up A: 350, B: 350 A: 50, B: 1000
Down A: 1000, B: 50 A: 800, B: 800
After both A and B have made a decision, both participants are told what
happened in the round, being informed of each participants decision and the
payoﬀs to each participant. In addition participants will see their own points
total so far.
———
Your total earnings from the experiment will be £1 for each 2000 points you get
during the rounds of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid your total earnings in cash and
asked to sign a receipt. You will also be asked to ﬁll in a short online question-
naire.
You have role A
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